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Some recent books on British moralists by Turco, Luigi
My paper moves from a hypothesis, perhaps a wrong one. This hypoth-
esis is not a speculative or theoretical one, but a hypothesis that deals with
how we read and interpret eighteenth century British philosophy, and, more
specifically, the British moral debate. According to Adam Smith’s account of
ethics in part VII of his Theory of moral sentiments, the foundation of morali-
ty is a modern problem, only slightly touched by the ancient moralists.
Whether ethics is based on reason or sentiment, is natural or artificial, is eter-
nal or historical, has its foundation in natural or revealed religion or has roots
totally independent from religion are meaningless issues in the ancient world.
In his Enquiry on the origin of moral virtue Mandeville, against the objection
that the “Distinction between Virtue and Vice” was not “the Contrivance of
Politicians, but the pure Effect of Religion”, repeats that he speaks “neither of
Jews or Christians, but Man in his State of Nature and Ignorance of the true
Deity”. “No States or Kingdoms under Heaven – he says – have yielded more
or greater Patterns in all sort of Moral Virtues than the Greek and Roman
Empires, more especially the latter; and yet how loose, absurd and ridiculous
were their Sentiments as to Sacred Matters?”1 But the young David Hume in
his letter to the Scottish physician states that “the moral Philosophy transmit-
ted to us by Antiquity, labor’d under the same Inconvenience that has been
found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depend-
ing more upon Invention than Experience. Every one consulted his Fancy in
erecting Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding human
Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend”2.
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1 B. MANDEVILLE, An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, in The Fable of the Bees: or,
Privates Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. by F.B. Kaye, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, vol. I, p. 50.
2 D. HUME, Letter to [Dr George Cheyne], in The Letters of David Hume, ed. by J.Y.T. Greig,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1932, vol. I, p. 16.
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In Selby-Bigge’s or Raphael’s continuously reprinted anthologies of
British Moralists it seems that religion had a minor or null role in their selec-
tion of the more relevant writers and excerpts. The secularisation of ethics is
taken for granted. 
Surprisingly in the last two decades, and especially in the last ten years,
religion, Christian religion, is the background or the context that gives sense
and meaning to the eighteenth century moral debate. A pioneer work explor-
ing this perspective is Isabel Rivers’ Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A study of
the language of religion and ethics in England, 1660-1780. The author has been
working on this project for over twenty-five years, or rather thirty, as the first
volume Whichcote to Wesley was published in 1991, and the second volume
in 20003. Rivers’ competence in the field is beyond discussion, as well as the
elegance, the accuracy and the subtlety of her discussion of published and
unpublished primary sources. What is her project? “My Subject is the lan-
guage of religious and moral prose, and my methods are those of the literary
historian of ideas. I have concentrated on language because I am interested in
the history of religious and moral thought for its own sake, not in relation to
another subject, such as science or politics, and believe that it is only through
the careful study of language that meaning can be ascertained”4. In her web
site at Queen Mary college of London University she defines three fields of
interest between 1660-1830: 1) Intellectual History, 2) Dissenting, Methodist
and Evangelical Literary Culture, 3) History of the Book. 
In her two volumes you can find brief magisterial descriptions of this or
that writer, that testify her deep understanding and extensive reading of the
author, although she usually defines her account as an oversimplification. The
volumes present a huge selection of quotations together with her subtle com-
ments. As an Italian scholar, accustomed to regard himself as an historian of
philosophy, rather than a philosopher, – a term that has probably its roots in
the permanent influence of the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy in our
country – I admit that I am rather confused by both the terms ‘history of
ideas’, ‘literary’ or not, and ‘intellectual history’. I found, for example, that
the scholars who define their field as ‘intellectual history’, are usually more
interested in the biography, sources, of the authors and in their connections
than in their philosophical, religious or scientific achievements. 
However, while reading a given writer – explains Rivers in her introduc-
tion – she asks many questions to him. I have counted nineteen different
3 I. RIVERS, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A study of the language of religion and ethics in
England, 1660-1780, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, vol. I: Whichcote to Wesley, 1991, vol. II:
Shaftesbury to Hume, 2000. 
4 RIVERS, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, vol. I, pp. 2-3.
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questions, often overlapping5. It would be tedious to report even a few of
them; I only want to emphasise, for the purpose of my paper, that the
authors’ intended audience for their different works is the most prominent
question. A curious characteristic of the five chapters in which each volume
is divided is that every chapter (excluding the first one of the first volume and
the last of the second) is divided itself into three parts. The first part is devot-
ed to the “intellectual milieu of the movement or thinker under discussion”,
the second part to the circumstances of publication, whereas “the third (the
most important) analyses ideas and their expressions”6. Nevertheless this tri-
partition is a bit deceiving because it is often infringed. 
It is worth quoting the clear initial statement of Rivers’ introduction
regarding the relationship between religion and ethics: “Broadly speaking,
two crucial shifts in ideas took place in this period.”
The first is an emphasis in Anglican thought on the capacity of human reason and
free will to co-operate with divine grace in order to achieve the holy and happy life.
This optimistic portrait of human nature represents a rejection of the orthodox
Reformation tradition, which stresses the depravity of human nature and God’s
arbitrary exercise of his free grace in electing the few to salvation. The second is the
attempt to divorce ethics from religion, and to find the springs of human action not
in the co-operation of human nature and divine grace but in the constitution of
human nature alone. The first shift comes to represent a new orthodoxy, and its
effects in the period are very wide-reaching; the second shift, which in part arises on
the first, remain heterodox in the period under consideration but its long-term
influences are incalculable. [...] The first volume “essentially explores the tension
between the languages of reason and grace”... The second volume “essentially
explores the tension between the language of reason and sentiment”.7
Therefore it seems that the general title is a bit misleading, as the triad
has to be divided in two dyads, the first belonging to internal changes of
Anglican thought and the second to the eighteenth century moral debate. But
it is not so. After a long chapter devoted to the new orthodoxy proposed by
the ‘latitude-men’ of Cambridge (Whichcote, Wilkins, Barrow, Tillotson,
Fowler, Patrick, Glanvill with the exception of Wilkins who comes from
Oxford), the first volume deals with: first, the resistance to the new ortho-
doxy by the non-conformist Baxter and Bunyan; second, the rhetoric of affec-
tions expressed by old dissenters like Watts and Doddridge, as well as the
Evangelical Revival of John Wesley. However, the whole first volume presents
itself as a text on the history of Anglican church between the Restoration and
5 Ivi, p. 3.
6 Ibid.
7 Ivi, p. 1.
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the middle of the eighteenth century, – written by an impartial scholar –
more interested in exploring the books and the conflicts internal to the estab-
lished church, than to doctrinal differences.
The second volume – and this explains perhaps why it has been pub-
lished after nine years – seems the work of a different author or, at least, on
a different subject. The religion of reason is a minor subject, while the anti-
Christian assault to revealed (and natural) religion is the main topic. This
possibly explains why the books open with sixty-eight pages on the true reli-
gion of nature exposed by the freethinkers who, according to Rivers, had not
much to say about ethics. “It is, however, a mistake to see the importance of
the freethinking movement as resting on any positive contribution to ethical
theory”8. Her chapter ends with Tindal: “The most unsatisfactory aspect of
Christianity as old as the creation is the fact that Tindal does not really deal
with ethics although his whole approach to religion is ethical”9; “He is prin-
cipally concerned with showing on the latitudinarian’ own terms that revela-
tion adds nothing to natural religion and that human reason is capable of
defining morality”10. The true protagonists of the volume are Shaftesbury in
the second chapter and David Hume in the fourth one. But, again, Rivers’
attention is focused on the complexity of the strategies adopted by
Shaftesbury to revive the ethics of the ancients than on Shaftesbury’s ethics. Her
exploration of the third book of the Characteristicks devoted to Miscellaneous
reflections is probably a unique piece in understanding the aim of this book.
But after following Rivers in these subtle pages the reader asks himself if 
her reading is too charitable towards her preferred author and whether the
Miscellaneous reflections are a rationalisation of Shaftesbury’s consciousness of
the many defects of his achievements. Rivers, at a certain point, wonders how
a work of such complexity could have had such a durable influence on the
posterior moral debate11. However once again the reader, following what
Rivers has written in the third paragraph about Shaftesbury’s ethics, asks him-
self whether Shaftesbury had done more than contrast the ethics of the
emperor and Epictetus to the Christian religion and to propose the same in
a language palatable to his modern readers.
We find again the scholar of the Anglican church in the third chapter
devoted to “the enormous influence of Shaftesburian moral thought”12 (3) and
entitled Defining the moral faculty: Hutcheson, Butler and Price. But I think
that this is the most biased among the chapters of the two books by Isabel
8 RIVERS, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, vol. II, p. 83.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ivi, p. 151.
12 Ivi, p. 3. 
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Rivers. She unwittingly downplays the relevance of Shaftesbury’s thought
when she lingers on the large catalogues of books, modern and ancient,
required to be read by the clerical students at Cambridge or published by
Foulis in Glasgow. The hidden thesis of Rivers is that Shaftesbury introduces
a subtle anti-Christian strategy, a sentimental ethics that is characterised by a
consonance of the mind with the providential order of the world, based on
the practice of a rational reflection. This perspective is totally Christianised,
especially in Scotland, where ‘moral sense’ is the substitute of ‘Grace’ and has
its foundation in the arbitrary will of God. Joseph Butler and above all
Richard Price, in his acute and “invaluable” book13, destroys Hutcheson’s the-
ory of moral sense, as it does not explain what moral obligation is and under-
mines the eternity and immutability of morality. This explains the idiosyn-
cratic selections of ethical writers by Rivers. Wishart (who never published a
page of ethics), Turnbull, or Fordyce are better treated than Hutcheson, a
“confused” author14. Shaftesbury’s influence on Butler is overrated, Price’s
Review of the principal questions and difficulties in Morals (1758) is diffusedly
presented in the final pages, whereas to the coeval Smith’s Theory of moral sen-
timents are given only a few pages in the chapter on Hume. By defining
Smith’s book as an eclectic book, Rivers shows she does not understand the
aim of Smith’s Theory. In this way, especially if we add to this the prosecu-
tion of this view in the final chapter of the book, the long influence of the
‘Religion of reason’, introduced at Cambridge in the age of Restoration, has
its beneficial effects on the ethical debate. 
However, the longest chapter devoted to Hume, presents us with almost
a different scholar from the one approving the new orthodoxy of the Church
of England.
English and Scottish moralists in the Shaftesburian tradition who founded morali-
ty in human nature were agreed that God has constituted nature and that the moral
faculty, however identified, was a divine implantation. Ethics and religion were
inseparable, because the moral human being reflecting on his own constitution
could not but recognise that his benevolent affections and moral sense were the gift
of his creator and confirmed that creator’s existence. [...] But the case of David
Hume (1711-1766) presented a real problem for his contemporaries. For Hume, the
basis of morality in sentiment, in human passions, affections, and feelings, meant
necessarily that it concerned only human life. Human experience provided no pos-
sibility of knowledge beyond the human, [...] Ethics and religion were separate sub-
jects of enquiry. Hume was convinced that the effects of Christianity on ethics had
been entirely damaging, and one of his aims was to restore the perspective of a par-
ticular group of classical moralists.15
13 Ivi, p. 169.
14 Cf. ivi, pp. 208, 215.
15 Ivi, pp. 238-239.
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These beautiful sentences of the first page of the chapter anticipate the
whole development of Rivers’ account of Hume. I cannot linger on “the
problem of the virtuous sceptic”16, or about Hume’s swinging between pru-
dence and raillery17. The doctrinal third paragraph is a long one18: from miti-
gated scepticism Rivers explores Hume’s non religious morals in book ii and
iii of the Treatise and the second Enquiry and his view of religion in every
other work by Hume19, ending her chapter, as often, quoting his friendly and
hostile critics. Surely Rivers is at her best when she deals with Hume as a crit-
ic of the natural and revealed religion and their pernicious influence on
morality, or Hume’s aggressive criticism of the clergy. Her account is a pleas-
ant reading for every specialist. But her illustration of Hume’s morality, mix-
ing quotations from the Treatise and the second Enquiry could be fair as an
introduction to Hume’s morality but contains many flaws. 
For example Hume’s “assumption that the source of morals is feeling
not reason, his use of taste, sense, instinct, affection, and benevolence, and
his attempt to undo the damage caused by Locke’s attack on innate ideas” is
according to Rivers a clear example of his “debt to the Shaftesburian tradi-
tion”20. This and similar statements imply a loose understanding of Hume’s
achievement in the field of ethics. Happily in the same page she observes
that “four key elements were unacceptable to contemporary readers: his dis-
tinction between the natural and the artificial virtues, his emphasis on the
utility and tendency of actions, his insistence that natural abilities cannot be
separated from moral virtues, and his refusal to search outside human nature
for the origins of moral principles and the obligation to perform moral
duties”21. However, only the last subject is explored in detail for its anti-
Christian relevance. 
How has Rivers’ “more than twenty five years of experience of reading a
very large quantity of controversial literature from the mid-seventeenth to the
late eighteenth centuries” helped to get a better understanding of the British
moral debate? She answers in her introduction that this long experience “has
convinced” her “that such debates, then or now, do not on the whole advance
the pursuit of truth”. This is a “third reason” – says in her introduction – “for
not entering into debates with modern interpreters”22. At page 204-205 Rivers
sums up the “several perspectives of accounts of the foundation of morals”,
associating terms and thinkers – ancient and modern – in six different groups
16 It is the title of the first section of the Chapter, ivi, pp. 238-264.
17 It is the title of the second section of the Chapter, ivi, pp. 264-282.
18 Ivi, third section: The science of human nature, pp. 282-329. 
19 Cf. Ivi, p. 283. 
20 Ivi, pp. 293.
21 Ibid.
22 Ivi, p. 5.
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or views “that are not necessarily mutually exclusive”. Writers mentioned here
are much more numerous than the authors that deserve a place in her two
volumes. I believe that Rivers agrees with her favourite Richard Price that,
regarding the foundation of morality, the eighteenth-century moral debate
has only produced a great deal of confusion.
Let me add a few pages on Daniel Carey’s Locke, Shaftesbury and
Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond (Cambridge
University Press, 2006). If Rivers’ volumes celebrate the glory of the new
orthodoxy established in Cambridge, and downplay the merits of Scottish
and Irish writers, Carey deals with the Oxonian Locke and pays more atten-
tion to the Scottish writers, not only Hutcheson, but also Kames, Ferguson
and Smith. If Rivers reads “seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debates in
their own terms”, the opposite Rortian approach of Carey is stimulated by the
current debates on multiculturalism and tries to find its roots in Locke’s
polemic against innate ideas, his large exploitation of travels and exotic liter-
ature, his denying our access to the real essences of substances. Locke’s
account of diversity was a challenge for the Stoical approach to the subject of
ethics and religion made by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Shaftesbury’s criti-
cism of the legalistic ethics of Locke, and his scorn for Locke’s law of opin-
ion, or of fashion, as well as for Locke’s credence on travel literature, have a
place here as well as in Rivers’ volume; nevertheless Carey finds his way of
giving a modern relevance to Locke’s critique of moral and religious innate
ideas, showing that today “conflicting positions reflect long-standing differ-
ences that first emerged during the Enlightenment”23.
Therefore Carey dedicates three chapters and almost half of his volume to
Locke and two chapters and the same number of pages to Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson and the different views of Hume, Smith, Kames and Ferguson.
The most interesting part of his exploration of the theme of diversity – at least
according to my knowledge of Locke – is the first chapter where Locke’s strat-
egy against innateness and his interest for travel literature is connected with
the Baconian methodology of natural history, the inductive method of accu-
mulation of evidence, as well as the similar projects of Boyle and Oldenburg.
Carey stresses that Locke in his Journal does not advance explicative hypothe-
ses and refuses to regard the most striking differences in custom and manners
(infanticide, parricide, cannibalism, incest) as degeneracy caused by education
or the result of the original sin. It is for me a novelty to know that Locke’s
library contains 195 volumes related to travel and exotic literature, or I find
precious – in the third chapter – Carey’s discussion of how Locke uses and cor-
rects his sources on the subject of atheist nations. Other themes supporting the
23 D. CAREY, Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and
Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, cover page.
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open attitude of Locke towards diversity (the denial of our access to real
essences, the conventionality of species, his connection with the French scep-
tical tradition, etc.) are surely well-known to the Lockean scholarship. 
However if in Rivers’ book there is an excess of quotations, in Carey’s
book I find a lack of quotations and a Rortian attitude to report historical
issues in our terms and arguments. To take Locke’s project of a natural his-
tory of man seriously, I would need more quotations from his Journal. The
few I find in Carey’s book testify special interests in Locke, for example in
the phenomenon of religious enthusiasm, or in the existence of atheists in
civilized nations. On the contrary these are subjects only slightly touched on
by Carey. I would say that Locke’s interest for diversity had its starting point
in the issue of religious differences, both doctrinal and practical, among
Christian churches and Sects that surely had a strong impact on the social
and political peace in the every day life of the British nation. The discussion
of Herbert of Cherbury’s five propositions or “common notions writ on our
Minds”24 shows why Locke could not agree with any policy of tolerance
based on a sum of consented tenets by different Christian confessions. Carey
discards the theme because the existence of religious differences among
Christians, “does not trace these disparities to an epistemic source” and
because Shaftesbury and Hutcheson “agreed with Locke’s views on tolerance
and therefore accepted an area of intractable social difference”25. In my view
it is not difficult to see why the book concentrates on the epistemic differ-
ences between Locke on one side and Shaftesbury and Hutcheson on the
other, and, at the end, on the epistemic difference between the dogmatic the-
ory of prolepsis in the Stoical thought and the ancient Sceptics. But, on
Locke’s side, the acceptance of incommensurable religious and moral differ-
ences among populations and nations does not result, as Carey acknowl-
edges, in relativism26. Here Carey should have confronted himself with the
projects of demonstrative ethics in the Essay concerning Human Under -
standing, as well as with Locke’s final solution found in the Reasonableness of
Christianity. On the other hand, while there is a lot that makes sense in
Carey’s understanding of Shaftesbury’s thought, Shaftesbury had much more
to say to justify moral preconceptions and universal values despite diversity
of manners and costumes, through his deep criticism of revealed religions, of
religious enthusiasm and superstitions, as well as through his recognition of
unnatural affections. 
24 J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1975, 1.3. 15, p. 77.
25 CAREY, Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, p. 6.
26 Cf. ivi, p. 35.
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I agree with Carey that Hutcheson presents a more complex question
because he tries to present his view as an implementation of Locke’s empiri-
cism, without dismissing Locke’s criticism of innate ideas. He correctly notes
that Hutcheson admits “the vast diversity of moral principles in various
nations, and ages” and takes it as “a good argument against innate ideas”, a
statement – says Carey – “prudently removed from the third edition”27; Carey
should have also noted that according to Hutcheson kind affections and a
moral sense are diffused among populations that scarcely have an idea of a
deity. But Carey not only downplays Hutcheson’s good arguments for justi-
fying diversity without renouncing to a moral sense, but also fails to give just
relevance to his criticism of Locke for not admitting different senses and kind
affections in human nature. Locke’s anthropology – as Carey interprets it – is
not the sole anthropology known by seventeenth and eighteenth writers.
There was another anthropological approach, just as controversial, based on
passions and affections. In this case, Locke’s Essay concerning Human
Understanding is particularly deficient. A Baconian natural history of man
appears to Carey to be more relevant for its similarities to contemporary eth-
nological approaches. But, first, it is arguable that Locke makes more than a
strategic use of the sceptical tradition and travel literature. Second, if we take
seriously his recognition of diversity, diversity was no less of a problem to
Locke than to Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. 
Isabel Rivers’ work is included in the secondary sources list of Carey’s
book. It does not appear among the secondary sources of Michael B. Gill,
The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics28. It is
surprising because there are striking similarities between Rivers’ and Gill’s
approach to the British moral debate. Both authors begin contrasting the
total depravity of human nature after the fall (and the voluntarist conception
of God) of the Calvinist orthodoxy with the capacity of Man for good and
virtue of the Cambridge Platonists’ new orthodoxy. Both authors believe that
this beginning had a long-standing influence on the British moral debate.
However there are striking differences between the two works. Gill’s book is
divided in four parts: one dedicated to Whichcote and Cudworth, one to
Shaftesbury, one to Hutcheson, and one to Hume. There are many views in
Gill’s book that Rivers would not embrace: the inclination to understand the
seventeenth-century British religious debate as a today question; the tenden-
cy to reduce historical questions and complicate doctrinal positions by for-
mulating sweeping arguments; the liking to confront his interpretations with
similar or different positions held by today scholarship. 
27 Ivi, p. 162.
28 M.B. GILL, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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In Gill’s brief introduction we read: “Are human beings naturally good
or evil? Are we naturally drawn to virtue or to vice? [...] Call this the Human
Nature Question.” It is not just an issue debated for centuries by thousands
Christian divines and turned into a dramatic cleavage with the Reformation.
“Most of us have asked the Human Nature Question at one time or anoth-
er”. Gill is thinking about monstrous acts of torture, genocide, slaughter. I
admit that in my experience I have asked the Human Nature Question only
after leaving from an extenuating condominium meeting in a bad temper.
However the question should have only two answers: the negative answer of
the English Calvinist (human nature is basically evil) or the positive answer
of the Cambridge Platonists (human nature is basically good)29.
I do not want to parody Gill’s interesting book; I have not time to fol-
low his fine comments on Whichcote’s and Cudworth’s sermons, and his
good analysis of many rational themes discussed by them. What I find
unbearable – for their lack of historical sense – is the sum of Gill’s arguments
and final sentences. For example, the following ones: “In the end, Whichcote
simply cannot reconcile his rationalism with his Christianity, and frankly, it’s
painful to watch him try”30; or, as to Cudworth’s Treatise concerning Eternal
and Immutable Morality, “There is no need, on this account, for Christ to
mediate between humans and God, because the rational faculty inside each
human turns it to be a means of direct access to the mind of God itself ”31.
Likewise, there is much that can be appreciated in Gill’s analysis of
Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit or The Moralists, a Philoso -
phical Rhapsody and that we cannot find in Rivers’ account of Shaftesbury’s
thought. But, according to Gill, “Shaftesbury’s sentimentalist moral psychol-
ogy” [developed by himself,] “conflicts with his rationalist moral ontology”32,
[“inherited from Whichcote”33] in the Inquiry, while in The Moralists
“Shaftesbury draws a very tight connection between morality and beauty,
going so far as to make the former a subset of the latter”34.“Drawing this tight
connection between morality and beauty was one of Shaftesbury’s major con-
tribution to the history of ideas”35. I would rather say that both that ontology
and the connection between morality and beauty are as old as the Stoical and
the Platonic approaches to ethics. What is new and that you cannot find in
Locke’s catalogue of simple ideas is the reflected sense on our affections.
29 Ivi, p. 1.
30 Ivi, p. 67.
31 Ivi, p. 74.
32 Ivi, p. 94.
33 Ivi, p. 99.
34 Ivi, p. 110. 
35 Ibid.
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Nevertheless Gill comes back to the said conflict at the end of this part
and discovers in some paragraphs added in the 1711 version of the Inquiry 
– that Shaftesbury presents as casual, whereas they are ‘terribly important’36 –
a sort of “Copernican revolution in moral philosophy”37. In fact “the study of
morality becomes a subset of the study of human nature”38. Here the tension
between an objective and a subjective theory of ethics is proposed, as
Shaftesbury has “two different accounts of our reason to be virtuous”39, the
“teleological account” and “the mental enjoyment account”. The first “claims
that the creatures are happiest when they live in accord with their design and
that humans were designed to be benevolent”. The second “reaches this con-
clusion through an examination of specific human affections”, and
Shaftesbury understands the second account as “a further confirmation of the
teleological principles”40.
In the paragraphs added to the Inquiry “The new idea is that is the men-
tal enjoyment account will be equally compelling whether our perceptions of
the external world are truthful or illusory”41. Even if the objects and the order
of external word are imaginary, as well as the “real amiableness of deformity
in moral acts”42, our obligation to virtue will be “in every respect the same”43.
Therefore in answering to the most radical scepticism, Shaftesbury “made
claims that implied that our obligation to virtue would remain just as com-
pelling if we assumed that God does not exist”44. This new step toward a secu-
lar ethics is not clearly developed by Gill, whereas I would say that the Human
Nature Question not only “begins to lose its footing”45 – as Gill says – but
becomes meaningless. However Shaftesbury ended up inspiring Hutcheson
and Hume to develop their own sentimentalist accounts of morality, where
their moral ontology “is clearly incompatible with a realm of human mind-
independent value”46.
Gill does not share with Rivers the disparaging attitude towards Hut-
cheson. Whereas Shaftesbury is “a better writer”, Hutcheson is “a better
philosopher” and “the form of Hutcheson’s philosophizing is much closer
36 Ivi, p. 118.
37 Ivi, p. 130.
38 Ibid.
39 Ivi, p. 118.
40 Ivi, p. 123.
41 Ivi, p. 124.
42 A. ASHLEY COOPER, Earl of SHAFTESBURY, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, in
Characteristiks of Men; Manners, Opinions, Times, (1737 edition) ed. by D. den Uyl, Indianapolis, Liberty
Fund, 2000, vol. II, p. 43.
43 Ivi, p. 173, quoted by GILL, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular
Ethics, p. 124. 
44 GILL, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics, p. 130.
45 Ibid.
46 Ivi, p. 132.
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than Shaftesbury’s to that of contemporary Anglo-American analytic philos-
ophy”47. The argumentative style of Hutcheson’s Enquiry on Virtue excites a
great deal of comments by Gill. Nevertheless, despite the sixty-three pages
devoted to Hutcheson, and the nineteen pages of notes (against fifty-four and
five dedicated to Shaftesbury), there is much that is not touched on by Gill’s
account. Take, for example Hutcheson’s moral arithmetic, his introduction of
public sense or the relationship between ethics and natural law. Why? I believe
that Gill’s favourite labels, Positive and Negative Answers to the Human
Nature Question – and the new Copernican Revolution in ethics – have
never proved in his book so useless as in the Hutcheson case.
I do not want to linger on the long part on Hume that concludes Gill’s
book and on his thirty pages of notes, where Gill discusses a large amount of
Hume’s literature. While I would agree with much that is said about the first
part of Hume’s book on Morality – especially where Gill states that part two
and three “are incompatible with Hutcheson’s moral sense theory”48 – I find
that the subsequent chapter on Hume’s associative moral sentiments is much
less clear than Hume himself and that much of the obscurity comes from the
positive or negative answer to Human Nature Question. Again, in comment-
ing on the artificial origin of justice Gill has good sense enough to compare
Hume’s view with the Mandeville, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury views. But I
leave any comment on the last two chapters of his book to the patient scruti-
ny of the analytic philosopher. 
There are other books published in the last decade that could support my
hypothesis: Paul Russell’s book is one of them and I do not want to repeat
what I said last year49. 
However, on the whole, what is my hypothesis? My hypothesis was that
focusing on the relationship between religion and ethics, perhaps is a fashion-
able attitude, but has not produced a better understanding of the British
moral debate.
47 Ivi, p. 144.
48 Ivi, p. 213.
49 Paul Russell’s The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Scepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion, Oxford
University Press, 2008 was presented by the author and discussed in the Humean Readings 2009.
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